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By Ron W. NIELSENa† 
 
Abstract. A simple but useful method of reciprocal values is introduced, explained and 
illustrated. This method simplifies the analysis of hyperbolic distributions, which are 
causing serious problems in the demographic and economic research. It allows for a 
unique identification of hyperbolic distributions and for unravelling components of more 
complicated trajectories. This method is illustrated by a few examples: growth of the 
world population during the AD era; growth of population in Africa; economic growth in 
Western Europe; and the world economic growth. They show that fundamental postulates 
of the demographic and economic research are contradicted by data, even by precisely the 
same data, which are used in this research. The generally accepted postulates are based on 
the incorrect understanding of hyperbolic distributions, which characterise the historical 
growth of population and the historical economic growth. In particular, data used, but 
never analysed, during the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory show that this 
theory is based on fundamentally incorrect premises and thus is fundamentally defective. 
In this theory, distorted representations of data are used to support preconceived and 
incorrect ideas. Precisely the same data, when properly analysed, show that the theory is 
incorrect. Application of this simple method of analysis points to new directions in the 
demographic and economic research. It suggests simpler interpretations of the mechanism 
of growth. The concept or the evidence of the past primitive and difficult living 
conditions, which might be perhaps described as some kind of stagnation, is not 
questioned or disputed. It is only demonstrated that trajectories of the past economic 
growth and of the growth of population were not reflecting any form of stagnation and 
thus that they were not shaped by these primitive and difficult living conditions. The 
concept or evidence of an explosion in technology, medicine, education and in the 
improved living conditions is not questioned or disputed. It is only demonstrated that this 
possible explosion is not reflected in trajectories of the economic growth and of the 
growth of population. Growth trajectories were increasing monotonically during the 
generally claimed epoch of stagnation and during the claimed explosion.  
Keywords. Hyperbolic distributions, Reciprocal values, Economic growth, Growth of 
human population, Industrial revolution, Unified Growth Theory, Growth regimes, Gross 
Domestic Product. 
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1. Introduction 
hat we are going to see will change the fundamental postulates in the 
demographic and economic research. It will change radically the way the 
mechanism of economic growth and of the growth of population is 
interpreted. Maybe the change will not come immediately because it is usually 
difficult to change the well-established interpretations and explanations but the 
change will come because this is the way science works. Incorrect interpretations 
are not tolerated for too long and it does not matter who are their advocates.  
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It might be expected that a complicated proof would be required to achieve such 
a radical change of direction in the economic and demographic research, that 
perhaps some new and complicated description of the mechanism of growth would 
have to be proposed. However, the proof turns out to be exceptionally simple. No 
complicated mathematics is required but only the way we describe data using the 
simplest mathematical representation: the straight line.   
George Pólya, Hungarian mathematician, observed that when a proof is too 
simple, “youngsters” will be unimpressed (Pólya, 1981), but mathematics does not 
have to be complicated to be useful. He also pointed out that solving problems is a 
quintessential human activity and the aim is always to find the simplest solutions.  
We are going to present here a proof so simple that it might look trivial. We are 
going to show how to change the confusing and complicated distributions 
describing the historical economic growth and the historical growth of human 
population into the simplest representations. We are going to show how the 
distributions, which suggest complicated explanations of the mechanism of growth 
are in fact so simple that they suggest also a simple mechanism.  
Analysis of data describing the historical economic growth and the historical 
growth of population might look complicated but it is exceptionally simple. 
Anyone can do it. However, there is more to the analysis of data then just looking 
for their mathematical descriptions. We are going to demonstrate that this simple 
method of analysis makes a significant contribution to a better understanding of the 
mechanism of the historical growth of population and of the economic growth. It 
also demonstrates that there is a need to replace the traditionally used postulates 
based largely on impressions and conjectures by postulates based on the 
mathematical analysis of data.   
 
2. The common problem 
Hyperbolic processes appear to be causing a serious problem in the economic 
and demographic research. They create such a strong illusion that it deceives even 
the most experienced and respected researchers. The common mistake is to see 
them as being made of two distinctly different components, slow and fast, with a 
clear transition between them (Ashraf, 2009; Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985; Baldwin, 
Martin & Ottaviano, 2001; Becker, Cinnirella & Woessmann, 2010; Clark 2003, 
2005; Currais, Rivera & Rungo 2009; Dalton, Coats & Asrabadi, 2005; Desment & 
Parente, 2012; Doepke, 2004; Ehrlich, 1998; Elgin, 2012; Galor 2005a, 2005b, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Michalopoulos, 2012; 
Galor & Moav 2001, 2002; Galor & Mountford, 2003, 2006, 2008; Galor & Weil, 
1999, 2000; Goodfriend & McDermott 1995; Hansen & Prescott 2002; Jones, 
2001; Johnson & Brook 2011; Kelly, 2001; Khan 2008; Klasen & Nestmann 2006; 
Kögel & Prskawetz 2001; Komlos 1989, 2000, 2003; Komlos & Artzrouni 1990; 
Lagerlöf 2003a, 2003b, 2006, 2010; Lee, 2003, 2011; Mataré, 2009; McFalls, 
2007; McKeown, 2009; McNeill 2000; Møller & Sharp, 2013; Mongomery, n.d.; 
Nelson, 1956; Omran 1971, 1983, 1986, 1998, 2005; Robine 2001; Smil 1999; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008; Steinmann, Prskawetz & Feichtinger, 1998; Strulik, 
1997; Tamura 2002; Thomlinson 1965; van de Kaa 2008; Voigtländer & Voth, 
2005; Vollrath, 2011;  Wang 2005, Warf 2010; Weisdorf  2004; Weiss 2007). The 
next step is then to try to explain these two perceived stages of growth and the 
associated but non-existent transition by proposing distinctly different mechanisms 
for each of these imagined components rather than seeing them as representing a 
single, monotonically increasing distribution governed by a single mechanism of 
growth.  
This step leads progressively further away from the correct understanding of 
studied processes because all efforts are now concentrated on explaining the non-
existing features. An increasing number of scholars are being involved. They do 
not analyse the relevant data but only describe their impressions created by 
hyperbolic illusions. The participating researchers do not question the existence of 
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the distinctly different stages of growth or of the postulated transition – they take 
them for granted and concentrate their attention only on the explanation of these 
phantom features, proposing new mechanisms, theories and mathematical 
descriptions without realizing that the apparent distinctly different two stages of 
growth do not exist and that there is no transition but a monotonically increasing 
hyperbolic distribution. Their mathematical descriptions, complicated and 
elaborate as they might be, are not the descriptions of the studied processes but 
rather the descriptions of phantom impressions created by hyperbolic illusions.  
The perceived two stages of growth are commonly described as stagnation and 
sustained growth, while the perceived but non-existent transition as an escape, 
sprint, sudden spurt, intensification, acceleration, explosion or by some other 
similar terms all emphasizing a clear and dramatic change in the pattern of growth 
at a certain time. Variety of forces and mechanisms are then proposed to explain 
the phantom stages of growth and of the associated but non-existent transition. 
Efforts are also made to determine the precise time of the non-existent transition, 
often placing it around the Industrial Revolution but sometimes around 1950, 
without realizing that the determination of this time is impossible because there 
was no unusual acceleration at any particular time or over a certain range of time.  
Hyperbolic processes are prone to misinterpretations and consequently they 
have to be analysed with care. Fortunately, their analysis is exceptionally simple. 
To show how to avoid being guided by hyperbolic illusions we shall describe the 
simple method of their analysis and illustrate it by a few examples. 
 
3. The method of reciprocal values 
Hyperbolic processes can be easily analysed using the method of reciprocal 
values. This method is so simple that it can be explained by using just two 
elementary equations, and yet so powerful that it can turn around and revolutionize 
such fields of research as the economic growth and the growth of human 
population, the important fields of study because for the first time in human 
existence we have now reached ecological limits of our planet and the correct 
understanding of these two processes is essential to avoid the undesirable 
unsustainable developments. We have to know how these processes work and how 
to control them. Incorrect interpretations are potentially dangerous and cannot be 
tolerated. Every effort has to be made to identify and eliminate any incorrect and 
misleading explanations.     
The first-order hyperbolic distribution is described by the following simple 
equation: 
 
1
0 1( ) ( )S t a a t
  ,                (1) 
 
where ( )S t is the size of a growing entity, while 
0a  and 1a  are constants. For the 
hyperbolic growth, 1 0a  . 
Example of hyperbolic growth is shown in Figure 1. It represents the growth of 
the world population during the AD era. We can see that hyperbolic distribution 
describes well the growth of population during the entire range of data.  
Data have to be analysed but in general they are not. Meticulous analysis of data 
is particularly important in the study of hyperbolic processes because they may be 
strongly misleading. They easily create an illusion of stagnation followed by 
explosion. Unfortunately, on seldom occasions when data are used and displayed, 
they are displayed in a grossely distorted and self-misleading way (Ashraf, 2009; 
Galor 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & 
Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 was reproduced from Galor’s publication (Galor, 2005a, p. 181). His 
figure was based on precisely the same source of data (Maddison, 2001) as used in 
Figure 1 but in this distorted way they show no resemblance of this original data. 
Such distortions were used repeatedly during the development of the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) making it scientifically unacceptable, 
incorrect and unreliable. This Figure shows incorrectly that there was a long epoch 
of stagnation followed by a takeoff to a fast growth.   
 
 
Figure 1. Example of hyperbolic growth. Population data (Maddison, 2001) taken from the 
same source as used by Galor in his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) are 
compared with hyperbolic distribution. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of distorted representation of data used in academic literature (Ashraf, 
2009; Galor 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Moav, 
2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Data presented in this figure come from precisely the same 
source (Maddison, 2001) as the data presented in Figure 1 but in this distorted way they 
bear no resemblance of the original data and they suggest incorrect interpretation of the 
mechanism of growth. Population is in millions and the GDP/cap in the 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
In discussions of the growth of population or of the economic growth it is easy 
to use some selected numbers and show that the growth was slow over a long time 
and fast over a short time. The slow growth is then interpreted as stagnation 
controlled by random forces of growth usually associated with Malthusian positive 
checks. The fast growth is interpreted as explosion controlled by distinctly different 
forces. The triggering mechanism of the alleged explosion is usually claimed to 
have been associated with the Industrial Revolution and Galor conveniently locates 
this alleged takeoff time around the time of the Industrial Revolution. Of course the 
growth was slow over a long time and fast over a short time because it was 
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hyperbolic. It was not because there was stagnation followed by a takeoff or 
explosion leading to a new type of growth.  
Hyperbolic distribution shown in Figure 1 is described by the eqn (1) with the 
following parameters 0 8.724a  and 
3
1 4.267 10a
   . The fit to the data is 
remarkably good. Details of analysis are described in a separate publication 
(Nielsen, 2016a). They show that there was a major transition from a fast 
hyperbolic growth to a slow hyperbolic growth around AD 1 and that there was a 
minor disturbance around AD 1300. However, these details are of no concern to us 
in our present discussion. What is important to notice is that the growth of human 
population was indeed slow over a long time and fast over a short time but that 
these features are described remarkably well by a single hyperbolic distribution. 
These features represent nothing more than mathematical properties of hyperbolic 
distribution. They represent a single mechanism of growth.  
It is important to point out that hyperbolic distribution increases monotonically. 
It makes no sense to divide it into two or three components and assign different 
mechanisms of growth to each perceived component. Hyperbolic distribution 
cannot and should not be divided into separate components and the best way to see 
it is to plot their reciprocal values 1[ ( )]S t  because they convert hyperbolic 
distribution to a straight line: 
 
1
0 1[ ( )]S t a a t
           (2) 
 
Reciprocal values of hyperbolic distribution shown in Figure 1 are plotted in 
Figure 3. It is precisely the same distribution as shown in Figure 1 but it is 
presented in a different way. The confusing features such as the apparent 
stagnation followed by a takeoff to a fast growth increasing to infinity are replace 
by a clear straight line, which is easy to understand. It is obvious now that it would 
make no sense to divide such a straight line into distinctly different components 
and to claim distinctly different mechanisms of growth. It is also clear that it is 
impossible to identify a transition from a slow to a fast growth for hyperbolic 
distributions. There is no transition at any time. The transition occurs gradually 
over the entire range of growth. It is impossible to identify a takeoff time because 
there was no takeoff.  
The display in Figure 3 is from AD 1000 for two reasons. (1) There is a large gap 
between AD 1 and 1000 so the display from AD 1000 shows better the agreement 
of the fitted hyperbolic distribution with data. (2) Detailed analysis of data for the 
AD and BC eras shows clearly that between around 500 BC and AD 500 there was 
a massive transition from a fast hyperbolic growth during the BC era to a 
significantly slower hyperbolic growth during the AD era (Nielsen, 2016a). The 
point at AD 1 is right in the middle of this transition and belongs to an entirely 
different distribution, the distribution describing the process of transition.  
It should be also noticed that the point at AD 1000 in Figure 3 appears to be much 
further away from the fitted distribution then the point in Figure 1. The distributions 
are precisely the same but the display of reciprocal values magnifies the 
discrepancies between data and the calculated curve for small values (Nielsen, 
2016b). The smaller are the values of the data and of the calculated distribution the 
larger is the magnification. 
Reciprocal values allow for a unique identification of the first-order hyperbolic 
distributions because only these distributions are represented then by straight lines. 
This representation allows also for an easy study of departures from hyperbolic 
growth because deviations from a straight line are easy to notice. 
Properties of growth do not change by changing the display of data but certain 
features, which are difficult or even impossible to recognize in one display can be 
easily identified in another. It is essential to remember that in the display of 
reciprocal values effects are reversed. Thus, for instance, a deviation to a slower 
trajectory will be indicated by an upward bending and deviation to a faster 
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trajectory by a downward bending. An increasing growth is represented by a 
decreasing trajectory of the reciprocal values. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reciprocal values of the hyperbolic distribution presented in Figure 1 together 
with the reciprocal values of the size of population. Complicated hyperbolic distribution is 
now represented by a simple straight line, which is easy to understand. The takeoff around 
1800 shown in Figure 2 did not happen. The straight line cannot be divided into two 
distinctly different components making it clear that hyperbolic distribution shown in Figure 
1 is also made of a single component. The slow and the fast growth shown in Figure 1 
follow the same, monotonically-increasing distribution. 
 
When hyperbolic growth is represented by a mathematically generated and 
gradually changing curve, such as shown in Figure 1, it might be clear that there 
was no particular time when the growth changed from being nearly horizontal to 
nearly vertical, but when data represented by discrete points are displayed, such a 
conclusion might be less obvious. The illusion becomes particularly strong when 
only a few strategically located points are selected (Ashraf, 2009; Galor 2005a, 
2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008) from a significantly larger set of data as if to make the 
deception even more pronounced. Even if the enforcement of the perceived illusion 
is unintended, such crude displays of data lead readily to grossly incorrect 
interpretations.   
However, if reciprocal values of data are displayed, their analysis is immediately 
made significantly simpler because if the data follow a simple, first-order 
hyperbolic distribution, their reciprocal values will be clearly aligned along a 
decreasing straight line. It is then obvious that dividing such a straight line into two 
sections and claiming two distinctly different regimes of growth governed by two 
distinctly different mechanisms simply makes no sense. It also makes no sense to 
try to locate a point on the decreasing straight line and claim a transition to a new 
trajectory because there is obviously no transition to a new trajectory on a 
decreasing straight line.  
It should be stressed that in this representation only the first-order hyperbolic 
distributions describing growth will follow the decreasing straight-line trajectories. 
It is for this reason that this simple method is so useful in identifying the first-order 
hyperbolic distributions. It is a simple and yet powerful method, which can be used 
successfully in the analysis of data describing the historical economic growth and 
the growth of human population, global, regional or local, because in general they 
follow simple, first-order hyperbolic trajectories. Any deviations from such 
trajectories can be easily investigated. Higher-order hyperbolic distributions 
describing growth will be represented by gradually decreasing trajectories, which 
could be fitted using higher-order polynomial functions intercepting the horizontal 
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axis, while the exponential growth will be represented by a decreasing exponential 
function. 
This method might have a more general application but its specifically intended 
application described in this publication is to help to avoid being guided by 
hyperbolic illusions, the unfortunate common mistake, which often leads to 
seriously incorrect conclusions as we shall son demonstrate. 
Going beyond the intended application, the first-order decreasing hyperbolic 
distributions will be represented by the increasing straight lines. Again, in this 
representation, any deviation from the decreasing hyperbolic distributions can be 
easily detected and investigated. Pareto distributions, which resemble the 
decreasing hyperbolic distributions, will be represented by gradually increasing 
functions, which in this representation might be also easier to investigate. 
We shall now illustrate the application of the method of reciprocal values by 
using three additional examples: the growth of human population in Africa, the 
economic growth in Western Europe and the world economic growth.  
 
4. Further examples 
4.1. Growth of population in Africa 
The method of reciprocal values can be used to study fine details of growth 
trajectories, the study which can then be used not only to improve the fit to data but 
also to understand the mechanism of growth. Some distributions might be made of 
different components, which could be difficult or even impossible to see in the 
direct display of data but they could be easily revealed by displaying their 
reciprocal values. An excellent example is the growth of human population in 
Africa shown in Figure 4, constructed using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010). 
These Figure illustrates the added advantage of using the reciprocal values of data.  
 
 
Figure 4. Growth of human population in Africa (Maddison, 2010) illustrates how the 
method of reciprocal values can serve as an excellent tool in revealing hidden features of 
studied distributions. 
  
The top panel in Figure 4 contains the direct display of data for the growth of 
human population in Africa. The displayed shape suggests hyperbolic growth 
because it is slow over a long time and fast over a short time.  
However, the reciprocal values of data presented in the lower panel reveal that 
the growth trajectory is in fact made of two major components: a slow hyperbolic 
distribution until around 1870 and a fast hyperbolic distribution after that year. 
Parameters describing the two hyperbolic components are 1
0 5.105 10a   , 
2
1 2.036 10a
   for the slow component and 20 1.705 10a   , 
2
1 8.515 10a
   for 
the fast component.  
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Figure 4 shows also that at a later stage, the fast hyperbolic growth started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory as indicated by the upward bending of the trajectory 
representing the reciprocal values. Furthermore, it is now clear that the growth of 
population in Africa was never stagnant and that there was never a transition from 
stagnation to growth. The first stage of growth was hyperbolic and the transition 
around 1870 was a transition from hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic growth. 
All these features, which are unrecognisable in the direct display of data are clearly 
seen in the display of the reciprocal values.  
The pattern revealed by data contradicts the traditional interpretations of the 
mechanism growth of human population. There was no escape from the Malthusian 
trap because there was obviously no trap in the growth of population. The growth 
was slow but it was increasing monotonically with no signs of restrictions imposed 
by a mythical trap.  
The transition from a slow to a fast hyperbolic growth in Africa occurred around 
the time of the Industrial Revolution but it was not a transition from a stagnant 
growth to a new, so-called sustained growth regime (Galor, 2005a, 2011) but from 
a hyperbolic growth to another but faster hyperbolic growth. It was the boosting 
that coincides with the intensified colonisation of Africa (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; 
McKay, et al., 2012; Pakenham, 1992).  
Contrary to the commonly accepted interpretations, this boosting in the growth 
of population was not triggered by a dramatically decreased intensity of Malthusian 
positive checks but by their dramatic escalation. It is clear that the accepted 
interpretations of the effects of Malthusian positive checks are incorrect. Their 
increased intensity does not lead to stagnation but to a more intensified growth 
(Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016c). The increased intensity of Malthusian positive 
checks increases the mortality rate but it also increases the fertility rate with the net 
result of increasing the rate of natural increase or the growth rate. This correlation 
is also clearly demonstrated even now by the growth of population in poor 
countries. The poorer they are the faster is the growth of their populations.  Thus, 
this simple analysis of data assisted by using the reciprocal values already 
questions the commonly accepted interpretations of the mechanism of growth of 
human population.  
As shown in Figure 4, reciprocal values of data reveal the details of the 
mechanism of growth, which were impossible to identify by the direct display of 
data. Even if we cannot yet fully explain these details, we can already see that the 
growth of the populations in Africa was following a slow hyperbolic trend until 
around 1870. Around that year, the growth of human population in Africa 
experienced an unprecedented 4-fold acceleration, which diverted the growth into a 
significantly faster hyperbolic trajectory. The fast-hyperbolic growth continued 
until around 1975 when it started to be diverted to a new but slower trend.  
It is this pattern of growth that we have to explain. It is for this pattern of growth 
that we have to propose the mechanism of growth. It is not the imaginary pattern of 
stagnation followed by explosion. It is not the fictitious Malthusian regime 
followed by the mythical takeoff from stagnation to an imagined sustained growth 
regime (Galor, 2005a, 2011). It is an entirely different pattern, the pattern indicated 
by the close analysis of data rather than by the pure fantasy.  The aim of scientific 
investigation is not to explain figments of imagination but the evidence presented 
by data.    
Data are essential in scientific investigations. Assisted by data we shall not be 
guided by the erroneous concept of stagnation but by the clear evidence of 
hyperbolic growth. We shall also not be guided by the erroneous concept of a 
takeoff from stagnation to a sustained growth regime but by the clear evidence of a 
transition from a hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic growth. We shall also be 
guided by an observation that at a certain stage, around 1975, the long-lasting 
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pattern of hyperbolic growth has been eventually abandoned and the growth was 
diverted to an entirely different trajectory.   
 
4.2. Economic growth in Western Europe 
Economic growth is measured using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the 
GDP per capita (GDP/cap). Galor & Moav (2002) studied economic growth in 
Western Europe using the data of Maddison (Maddison, 2001). They have selected 
a few, strategically located points from a larger set of data, joined them by straight 
lines and concluded that there were two distinctly different regimes of growth: the 
“Malthusian regime” (also labelled as the “epoch of stagnation,” “Malthusian era,” 
“Malthusian epoch,” “Malthusian steady-state equilibrium,” “Malthusian 
stagnation” or “Malthusian trap”) and the “sustained economic growth” (described 
also as the “Modern Growth Regime,” “sustained economic growth” and 
“sustained growth regime”). Their distorted representation of Maddison’s data is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. A typically distorted and self-misleading representation (Galor & Moav, 2002, p. 
1136) of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001). Compare it with exactly the same data, but not 
distorted, presented in Figure 7. 
 
Referring to this crude display of data they also concluded that the Industrial 
Revolution had a strong impact on the economic growth causing a dramatic takeoff 
from stagnation to a fast growth. They made no attempt to analyse mathematically 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) but presented a series of mathematical 
equations describing their imaginations, which were neither related to nor 
supported by the source of data they have used.  
It is remarkable that data coming from precisely the same source as they have 
used contradict their claims and their interpretations of growth. Extensive analysis 
of the GDP/cap data, global and regional, is presented in a separate publication 
(Nielsen, 2016d). It is shown there that GDP/cap data follow the monotonically 
increasing trajectories. They are just the linearly modulated hyperbolic trajectories 
(Nielsen, 2017a), i.e. hyperbolic trajectories modulated by the linear time-
dependence of the reciprocal values of the size of population. There is no 
stagnation and no takeoff to a distinctly different regime of growth. Both, the GDP 
and the population increase hyperbolically (Nielsen, 2016b, 2016e, 2016f) and thus 
monotonically. Consequently, their ratios increase also monotonically. 
Figure 6 presents the reciprocal values of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
Western Europe (Maddison, 2001) in the vicinity of the alleged takeoff. The data 
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are well aligned along a decreasing straight line, which means that they were 
following the simplest, first-order, hyperbolic distribution given by the eqn (1). 
 
 
Figure 6. Reciprocal values of data describing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
Western Europe (Maddison, 2001) in the vicinity of the Industrial Revolution. This is 
precisely the same source of data as used by Galor & Moav (2002) to construct their 
distorted representation shown in Figure 5. Contrary to their claim, Industrial Revolution 
had no effect on shaping the economic growth trajectory in Western Europe, the centre of 
this revolution. The two regimes of growth claimed by them also did not exist. The GDP is 
in billions of the 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
Industrial Revolution was between 1760 and 1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994), 
or around 1800 as shown in Figure 6. This figure demonstrates clearly and 
convincingly that the claimed takeoff around the time of the Industrial Revolution 
did not happen because the reciprocal values of the GDP data follow an 
undisturbed straight line trajectory representing an undisturbed hyperbolic growth. 
It is now clear that there was no takeoff and no escape, great or small, from the 
hypothetical but non-existing Malthusian trap, at least from the alleged trap in the 
economic growth. Maybe there were some other traps but maybe they are just 
figments of imagination. It is clear, however, that Industrial Revolution had 
absolutely no impact on shaping the economic growth trajectory in Western 
Europe, the centre of this revolution.  
Industrial Revolution had, no doubt, many other impacts but they are not 
reflected in the economic growth trajectory. Their study could be important and 
interesting but they will not explain the growth of the GDP. The mechanism of 
growth was immune to the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution. 
Whatever dramatic changes the Industrial Revolution might have introduced to the 
general style of living, to technology and even to the economic marked, these 
changes obviously were not shaping the economic growth trajectory.  
The absence of a takeoff eliminates also the need for assuming the existence of 
two distinctly different regimes of growth. It obviously makes no sense to divide 
the straight line into two arbitrarily selected sections and claim distinctly different 
trajectories governed by distinctly different mechanisms of growth. What might not 
have been clear in the direct display of data, is now perfectly obvious if we display 
the reciprocal values of data. This display abolishes all elaborate theories and 
untidy explanations incorporating such concepts as traps, escapes, takeoffs and 
stagnation and replaces them by a simple interpretation of the mechanism of 
growth suggested by the simple equation describing hyperbolic growth. This 
conclusion is in agreement with the general observation that natural phenomena 
can be usually explained by using simple descriptions.    
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.288-309. 
298 
In Figure 7, the hyperbolic trajectory corresponding to the straight line shown in 
Figure 6 is extended to AD 1. The economic growth in Western Europe is well 
described by a simple, first-order, hyperbolic distribution. The corresponding 
parameters are: 2
0 9.697 10a
   and 51 5.020 10a
   . The point at 1950 is not 
fitted by the hyperbolic trend because from the early 1900s the economic growth in 
Western Europe started to be diverted to a slower trajectory, which is again 
contrary to the claimed boosting or a transition from stagnation to growth. There 
was a transition but it was a transition from a monotonically increasing hyperbolic 
growth to a slower trajectory.   
 
 
Figure 7. Data for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Western Europe (Maddison, 2001) 
compared with the monotonically increasing hyperbolic distribution. The GDP is in billions 
of the 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
We cannot claim that the growth was sustained only after the Industrial 
Revolution because it was sustained equally strongly during the postulated but non-
existent “epoch of stagnation.” Figure 6 and Figure 7 show clearly that the concept 
of two stages of growth is unsupported by data. When stripped of the hyperbolic 
illusions, the economic growth is revealed as a simple process, which can be 
described using just one, simple mathematical trajectory until the early 1900s when 
it started to be diverted to a slower, non-hyperbolic, trajectory. There is no 
compelling need to make this simple description complicated. 
Growth of the GDP was slow in the past because it was hyperbolic. However, 
while being slow it was not stagnant. The growth was fast in recent years because it 
was hyperbolic. It followed the same undisturbed hyperbolic distribution as in the 
past. 
We now have a completely different understanding of the economic growth in 
Western Europe, an important turnaround in the economic research. Rather than 
wasting the valuable time, energy and financial resources on trying to explain the 
phantom features created by hyperbolic illusions and magnified by the customary 
crude representation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) 
we can now focus our attention on the relevant task of trying to explain why the 
economic growth was so stable over such a long time and why it was hyperbolic. 
Rather than writing numerous articles based on impressions and publishing them in 
peer-reviewed scientific journals and in academic books we can now concentrate 
our attention on the understanding of the science of economic growth. In our 
investigations, we shall not be guided by impressions, we shall not be guided by 
the customary crude representations of data but by their rigorous mathematical 
analysis 
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4.3. Global economic growth 
Another example of the application of the method of reciprocal values is the 
global economic growth. It is an important example because it questions Galor’s 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) representing the culmination of his 
work extending over 20 years (Baum, 2011). His theory is based on an uncritical 
acceptance of the common interpretations, descriptions and explanations used in 
the economic and demographic research. In this sense, his theory offers no new 
insights.  
The fundamental postulate of this theory is again the existence of three regimes 
of growth: the slow and stagnant Malthusian Regime, the short and intermediary 
Post-Malthusian Regime and the fast, Sustained Growth Regime. Galor also 
accepts that Industrial Revolution played a crucial role in the alleged dramatic 
takeoff from a prolonged stagnation into a rapid and sustained growth.  
The welcome initiative in his theory is that he makes an attempt of using 
repeatedly Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001). However, he makes not even a 
single attempt to test his theory by the rigorous analysis of data. This is a serious 
mistake. The usual practice in any scientific theory is to test it by data or at least to 
suggest how it can be tested by data. Galor does not follow this accepted practice. 
He does not test his mathematical descriptions by data. Data are used repeatedly 
but they are never analysed. They are presented in a typically distorted way, as 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 5, and in this distorted way they seem to support the 
preconceived ideas. His work is based on prejudice and no attempt is made to 
check its validity.  
When data are used but manipulated to confirm preconceived ideas we are not 
dealing with science. We also make no progress and we are not learning anything 
new or useful.  
We shall now use exactly the same source of data and show that the Unified 
Growth Theory is scientifically unacceptable. For more extensive discussion of 
these issues see other publications (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 
2016g, 2016h, 2016i, 2016j, 2017a). 
It is hard to see how much can be rescued from Galor’s Unified Growth Theory. 
It is hard to see how many of his descriptions and explanations are based on pure 
and unsubstantiated speculations. His theory would have to be minutely analysed. 
However, its major premises are untenable. All his “mind boggling” “mysteries of 
the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p 220), for instance, can be easily explained 
(Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d, 2016g, 2016i) – there are no mysteries. All his mysteries 
were created by his repeatedly distorted presentations of data coming from a 
reputable source (Maddison, 2001), the data used during the formulation of his 
theory but never properly analysed.  
His theory certainly does not explain the mechanism of growth because it 
revolves around the descriptions of hyperbolic illusions. It does not even describe 
economic growth. His descriptions are incorrect because again they are based on 
the distorted presentations of data and on the unsubstantiated prejudice. 
Theories come and go. Scientific integrity is not tarnished by proposing 
incorrect explanations and interpretations but by refusing to correct them or to 
reject them when they are contradicted by reliable data.   
Reciprocal values of data for the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Maddison, 2001) are shown in Figure 8. They follow closely a decreasing straight 
line, which means that the economic growth was increasing hyperbolically. It is 
clear that there was no takeoff of any kind, large or small, around the time of the 
Industrial Revolution and no repeatedly claimed great escape from the postulated 
but non-existing Malthusian trap. The data do not support the existence of the three 
regimes of growth and thus contradict the fundamental postulates of the Unified 
Growth Theory. 
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Figure 8. Fundamental concepts of the Unified Growth Theory are contradicted by 
precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001), which were used (but never analysed) during its 
development. Reciprocal values of data follow closely a decreasing linear distribution 
representing a monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. The three regimes of growth 
claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011) did not exist. There was no takeoff around the time of the 
Industrial Revolution or around any other time. The monotonically increasing hyperbolic 
growth remained undisturbed until the 1990s. The GDP is in billions of the 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
The last point of the data shown in Figure 8 is not fitted by the straight line, 
suggesting a possible diversion to a slower trajectory. This region can be studied 
more closely using the extended compilation of the economic growth data 
(Maddison, 2010). Their reciprocal values between 1700 and 2003 are shown in 
Figure 9 demonstrating clearly that while the Unified Growth Theory claims an 
unusually accelerated growth after the alleged but non-existent epoch of stagnation, 
the data show the opposite behaviour: a diversion to a slower trajectory after the 
earlier vigorous, well-sustained and secure economic growth. Rather than being 
boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the economic growth continued along the 
undisturbed hyperbolic trajectory for about one hundred years after this revolution 
and then started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
Figure 9 illustrates again how the method of reciprocal values can unravel useful 
details about a studied process. Not only does it help in an unambiguous and easy 
identification of hyperbolic distributions but also it helps in an easy detection of 
deviations from such distributions. The world economic growth continues to 
increase but from the early 1900s it started to be diverted away from the faster 
accelerating historical hyperbolic trajectory to a slower trend. 
The point of intersection of the reciprocal values with the horizontal axis is the 
point of singularity when the growth escapes to infinity. No growth can go beyond 
this point and any growth close to it may become unstable, unsustainable and 
catastrophic. Figures 8 and 9 show how close we are now to the point of the 
potential global economic instability and unsustainability.  
Unified Growth Theory claims that after a long epoch of stagnation we have 
now reached an era of “sustained economic growth,” the term repeated 82 times in 
the first detailed formulation of this theory (Galor, 2005a), the potentially 
misleading description because while it is true that the current economic growth is 
still sustained the past economic growth was not only sustained but also it was 
increasing along a more secure trajectory, far away from the point of singularity. 
Even though the growth is now diverted to a slower trajectory any further increase 
can be potentially dangerous. 
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Figure 9. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) show clearly that while the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) claims a transition from stagnation to a vigorous growth, the 
data show the opposite behaviour: a transition from a vigorous hyperbolic growth to a 
slower trajectory, as indicated by the upward bending of the growth trajectory of the 
reciprocal values during the 1990s and 2000s. There was no stagnation and no boosting in 
the economic growth at any time. The claimed (Galor, 2005a, 2011) but non-existent three 
regimes of growth are also shown. Their existence is contradicted by data. The GDP is in 
billions of the 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
Reciprocal values of data show that for the first time during the AD era, and 
probably for the first time in human existence, we are now trapped between the 
already high level of economic growth and a point of no return, or equivalently 
between the very small reciprocal values of the GDP and zero. Any intrusion into 
this narrow gap has to be closely monitored. Even if the trend of the reciprocal 
values of the GDP data does not cross the horizontal axis any close approach to this 
axis could be dangerous, because it could trigger global economic instability and 
even a possible global economic collapse.  
This simple analysis of data shows how dangerous are the generally accepted 
postulates presented in the Unified Growth Theory. The concept of a transition 
from stagnation to the so-called sustained growth regimes suggests that now for the 
first time in human history we can enjoy the sustained economic growth. Data, 
however, reveal a diametrically different pattern of growth. It was in the past that 
the economic growth was sustainable because it was following a stable hyperbolic 
distribution, which was still far away from the point of singularity. Now, however, 
the reciprocal values of the GDP are so close to zero, i.e. to the point when the 
GDP escapes to infinity, that the economic growth is no longer easily sustainable. 
The possibility of a serious economic instability is real. Now, the economic growth 
has to be closely monitored and controlled. The claim that we are now in the 
regime of sustained economic growth is dangerously inaccurate and misleading. 
 The method of reciprocal values can be also used to demonstrate that two other 
postulates of the Unified Growth Theory, the postulate of the differential takeoffs 
and the postulate of the great divergence, are contradicted by the mathematical 
analysis of data coming from the same source, which was used during the 
formulation of this theory (Nielsen, 2016b, 2016e, 2016i). Takeoffs never 
happened and consequently it makes no sense to claim that they happened at 
different times for developed and developing regions. The so called great 
divergence also never happened. Different regions are on different levels of 
development but they follow closely similar trajectories. They are like athletes 
running along similar tracks. They do not run in distinctly different directions as 
incorrectly claimed in the Unified Growth Theory but in the same direction.    
If the economic growth continued along the historical hyperbolic trajectory it 
would have already reached a point of no return as indicated by the fitted straight 
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line crossing the horizontal axis. To use the colourful description of von Foerster, 
Mora & Amiot (1960), we have been saved from experiencing a doomsday in the 
global economic growth. However, the danger of an excessive and unsustainable 
growth is still not averted. 
Under a suitable control, the economic growth can continue for a long time, but 
this is precisely the important point: from now on the economic growth has to be 
closely monitored and controlled because it can easily become unsustainable.  
Data between 1965 and 2003 follow closely exponential trajectory. Exponential 
growth does not increase to infinity at a fixed time but this is hardly any 
consolation because eventually such a growth also becomes unsustainable.  
Any other continually increasing growth can be unsustainable unless it is 
increasing to a certain constant asymptotic value. However, it is extremely difficult 
to control such a growth because the growth rate would have to finely tuned to 
decrease slowly to zero. A constant growth rate, even if small, would represent the 
undesirable exponential growth. A growth rate fluctuating around zero would be 
safe but our general tendency is to try to increase the growth rate or at least to keep 
it constant, both options leading to unsustainable economic growth.   
Data describing the world economic growth (Maddison, 2001) are compared in 
Figure 10 with the hyperbolic trajectory calculated using the straight-line fitted to 
the reciprocal values shown in Figure 8. Parameters describing the historical 
hyperbolic growth of the world GDP are: 2
0 1.716 10a
   and 61 8.671 10a
   .  
 
Figure 10. The data for the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Maddison, 2001) follow 
closely the first-order hyperbolic distribution. The claimed three regimes of growth (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) did not exist. They are replaced by an uninterrupted and monotonically 
increasing hyperbolic growth. The GDP is in billions of the 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
 
Now the puzzling features of the economic growth, the features that prompted 
so many discussions in numerous peer-reviewed scientific journals culminating in 
the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory, are manifestly clear, and their 
explanation is surprisingly simple. Over hundreds of years, the world economic 
growth was slow because it was hyperbolic. Over a short time, until the early 
1900s, the economic growth was fast because it was hyperbolic – it followed the 
same undisturbed hyperbolic trajectory as in the past. The apparent transition from 
a slow to a fast growth is just an illusion created by the hyperbolic distribution. 
There was no unusually accelerated transition from the slow to the fast economic 
growth. The acceleration was gradual over the entire range of time. 
The study presented here shows how important it is to have a clear 
understanding of the economic growth and how the simple method of reciprocal 
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values can assist in such studies. Application of this method can not only assist in 
unravelling different components of growth trajectories but also to avoid being 
guided by hyperbolic illusions, which are the source of numerous 
misinterpretations of economic growth and of the growth of population culminating 
in the formulation of the fundamentally flawed and strongly misleading Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011).   
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
We have described a simple but effective method of analysis of hyperbolic 
distributions and we have explained its application by using the growth of the 
world population during the AD era. We have then demonstrated the flexibility of 
this method by using an example of the growth of human population in Africa. 
This method can be used to identify uniquely the first order hyperbolic 
distributions, to reveal hidden components of growth trajectories and to remove 
hyperbolic illusions, which are the source of numerous misinterpretations of 
economic growth and of the growth of population, misinterpretations prevailing 
over a long time in academic literature. This simple method redirects the economic 
and demographic research from explanations of phantom features created by 
hyperbolic illusions, to explanations based on the scientific analysis of data.  
We have presented two other examples of analysis of data: the economic growth 
in Western Europe and the global economic growth. All these four examples show 
that the rigorous analysis of data contradicts the established knowledge in 
demography and in the economic research, and in particular, that it contradicts the 
fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). 
However, what we have presented here is just a tip of an iceberg. An entirely new 
world is opened when we analyse more data (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 
2016f, 2016g, 2016h, 2016i, 2016j, 2016k, 2016l, 2016m, 2016n, 2016o, 2016p, 
2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d), the world without stagnation in the economic growth 
and in the growth of population, without takeoffs from the alleged stagnation to 
growth, the world without complicated and untidy explanations of the mechanism 
of growth but the elegant world where data can be described by simple 
mathematical distributions, the world, which opens up new vistas for the 
demographic and economic research. 
Impressions can be strongly deceptive and persuasive. “It is clear that the earth 
does not move, and that it does not lie elsewhere than at the centre” declared 
Aristotle. Fortunately, however, in science, incorrect interpretations are sooner or 
later corrected.  
1. Stagnation. Research based on impressions and reinforced by the customary 
crude and self-misleading representations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor 2005a, 
2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008), such as shown in Figures 2 and 5, seems to confirm 
the generally accepted belief that there was an epoch of stagnation in the 
economic growth and in the growth of population. Scientific analysis of 
precisely the same (but undistorted) data demonstrates that there was no 
stagnation and that the economic growth and the growth of population 
followed monotonically increasing hyperbolic distributions.  
2. Takeoffs. Research based on impressions seems to indicate that there was a 
transition from stagnation to growth described usually as a takeoff or 
explosion. Scientific analysis of precisely the same (but undistorted) data 
demonstrates that there was no takeoff or explosion and that economic growth 
and the growth of population continued to follow the monotonically increasing 
hyperbolic distributions. What appears as a takeoff or explosion is in fact the 
natural continuation of hyperbolic growth.  
3. Industrial Revolution. Research based on impressions seems to indicate that 
Industrial Revolution played a crucial role in the economic growth and in the 
growth of population causing a dramatic acceleration (boosting) in the growth 
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trajectories, described as takeoffs. Scientific analysis of precisely the same 
(but undistorted) data demonstrates that Industrial Revolution had absolutely 
no impact on shaping growth trajectories. Industrial Revolution can be linked 
to other impacts but not to shaping the population or the economic growth 
trajectories. This might be surprising but the evidence in data is undisputable 
and we have to accept it. 
4. Regimes of growth. Research based on impressions seems to suggest that 
there were two or maybe even three distinctly different regimes of growth 
governed by distinctly different mechanisms (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Scientific 
analysis of precisely the same (but undistorted) data demonstrates that these 
two or three distinctly different regimes of growth did not exist. The growth 
was hyperbolic until recently when it started to be diverted to slower 
trajectories. 
5. Mysteries. Research based on impressions resulted in claiming a series of 
“mind-boggling” and “perplexing” “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220).  Scientific analysis of precisely the same data 
demonstrates that all these mysteries belong to the world of fiction created by 
a good dose of fantasy guided by the misleading impressions and reinforced 
by the customarily distorted presentations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor 2005a, 
2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008) such as shown in Figures 2 and 5. Science is 
supported by a methodical analysis of data. There are no mysteries when 
precisely the same data are properly analysed.  
In particular, the mystery of the great divergence is explained: there was no 
great divergence (Nielsen, 2016i). Various regions are on different levels of 
economic growth but they all follow closely similar trajectories. Their 
economic growth did not diverge into distinctly different trajectories as 
incorrectly suggested by the crude representations of data.  
The mystery of the alleged sudden spike in the growth rate of income per 
capita has been explained: there was no sudden spike (Nielsen, 2016g). The 
growth rate of income per capita followed a monotonically increasing 
trajectory, which is readily represented by a mathematical distribution derived 
using hyperbolic growth for the growth of the GDP and for the growth of 
population.  
The mystery of the puzzling features of income per capita has been 
explained (Nielsen, 2017a). The distribution representing income per capita is 
nothing more than just a linearly modulated hyperbolic distribution. It reflects 
nothing more than the purely mathematical property of dividing two 
hyperbolic distributions.  
Other questions listed by Galor as representing the mysteries of the growth 
process can be easily answered. They refer to features that do not exist, 
features based on impressions reinforced by ineffectual handling of empirical 
evidence. They are in the same category as the question “Why does the sun 
revolve around the earth?”  
6. Mechanism. Research based on impressions leads to proposing numerous 
complicated mechanisms of growth. Scientific analysis of data shows that the 
mechanism of growth is exceptionally simple (Nielsen, 2016p), which is 
hardly surprising because hyperbolic distributions are described by an 
exceptionally simple equation [see eqn (1)].  
7. Unified Growth Theory. Research based on impressions prompted the 
development of a Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Mathematical 
analysis shows that the fundamental postulates of this theory are contradicted 
by the same data, which were used during its development. Galor could have 
saved 20 years of his life and could have directed his academic skills to 
developing a useful theory if he did what any scientist is supposed to do: if he 
based his deductions and explanations on a scientific analysis of data. He had 
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access to excellent data but he did not analyse them. He was guided by 
preconceived ideas and he supported them by distorted presentations of data.  
The analysis data suggests new lines of research. Thus, for instance, the relevant 
question is not why the historical economic growth was so unstable in the past or 
what caused the perceived transition from alleged stagnation to growth but why the 
economic growth was so remarkably stable in the past. The same question applies 
to the growth of population but it was already answered (Nielsen, 2016c, 2017d). 
The growth of population was remarkably stable because of the combination of the 
generally low impacts of demographic catastrophes (at least on the global and 
regional scales) and the high level of human resilience expressed in the efficient 
process of regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016c). If we accept that there is 
a close relationship between the growth of population and the economic growth, 
then the question about the stability of the historical economic growth has been 
also already answered. However, it is possible that some new insights could be still 
added to this explanation.    
The relevant question is not why the Industrial Revolution and the 
unprecedented technological development boosted the economic growth because 
they did not. The relevant question is why the Industrial Revolution and the 
unprecedented technological development did not boost the economic growth. Why 
these apparently strong technological and socio-economic forces had no impact on 
shaping the economic growth trajectories.  
The relevant question is not why the economic growth increased so fast in 
modern time, because we have shown that this fast increase was just the natural 
continuation of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth until in recent 
years it started to be diverted to a slower but still fast-increasing trajectory. The 
relevant question is why the economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory. 
What new force or forces were so strong that they were able to overpower the 
historically strong force of growth. Another relevant question is also whether this 
new trajectory is likely to develop into a historically preferable and potentially 
catastrophic, hyperbolic growth. Furthermore, the relevant question is how to 
control the current fast economic growth. The same question applies also to the 
growth of population but it was at least partly answered in the study of the effects 
of Malthusian positive checks (Nielsen, 2016c). The primary if not exclusive way 
of controlling the growth of human population is to improve the living conditions 
in developing countries.  
The method of reciprocal values is so simple that it can be used by anyone and it 
is, therefore, expected that it will be of interest to many scientists who look for a 
simple method of analysis of empirical evidence, a method that does not involve 
any complicated mathematical formulae, any intricate mathematical algorisms or 
the use of powerful computers but a simple display of data and a remarkably 
simple fitting procedure. We have demonstrated that even a simple mathematical 
method can have a dramatic influence on scientific research. 
 It is essential to understand that by claiming that there was no stagnation in the 
economic growth or in the growth of population we are not claiming that there was 
no stagnation in the standard of living. We are only claiming that the two processes 
were decoupled. We might, if we insist, describe the past general living conditions 
as primitive or even stagnant, but there is no evidence that they were shaping the 
trajectories describing the growth of population or the economic growth. 
It is also essential to understand that by claiming that there was no takeoff in the 
economic growth or in the growth of population we are not claiming that there was 
no takeoff in the technological development, or generally in the intellectual 
progress and in the dramatic changes in human experience and in living conditions. 
We are only claiming that these possible takeoffs had no impact on changing the 
economic growth trajectories or the trajectories describing the growth of 
population. There were no takeoffs in any of these two processes. Industrial 
Revolution can be linked with many changes in human living experience but all 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.288-309. 
306 
these changes had no impact on changing the economic or demographic growth 
trajectories.   
There is no reason why scientific evidence presented here and in other related 
publications (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h, 
2016i, 2016j, 2016k, 2016l, 2016m, 2016n, 2016o, 2016p, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 
2017d) should not be accepted by the scientific community. The only alternative 
option is to reject data but this would be no longer science.   
Even Galor and his associates accept the same data and use them in their 
research. Their unfortunate mistake was only in choosing to support their 
investigations by the grossly distorted and self-misleading representations of data 
(Ashraf, 2009; Galor 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Consequently, the only 
way to reject scientific evidence and to accept the doctrines of stagnation and 
takeoffs, and all other associated erroneous explanations of the dynamics of the 
economic growth and of the growth of population, is to accept data but distort them 
in such a way as to make them to conform with preconceived ideas, but then again 
it is not science.  
Evidence in data is overwhelming and leaves no room for accepting incorrect 
interpretations. In order to have progress in the demographic and economic 
research, incorrect interpretations of growth have to be abandoned and a new 
paradigm has to be developed. There is no other, scientifically justified, way. A 
serious mistake in scientific investigations is not in stumbling and in making 
mistakes but in refusing to learn from them and to correct them. 
 
References 
Ashraf, Q.H. (2009). Essays on Deep Determinants of Comparative Economic Development. Ph.D. 
Thesis, Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence. 
Artzrouni, M. & Komlos, J. (1985). Population growth through history and the escape from the 
Malthusian trap: A homeostatic simulation model. Genus, 41, 21-39.  
Baldwin, R.E., Martin, P., & Ottaviano, G.I.P. (2001). Global income divergence, trade, and 
industrialization: The geography of growth take-offs. Journal of Economic Growth, 6(1), 5-37. 
doi. 10.1023/A:1009876310544 
Baum, D. (2011). Oded Galor: Economic Growth Process over 100,000 Years. [Retrieved from].  
Becker, S.O., Cinnirella, F., & Woessmann, L. (2010). The trade-off between fertility and education: 
Evidence from before the demographic transition. Journal of Economic Growth, 15(3),177–204. 
doi. 10.1007/s10887-010-9054-x 
Clark, G. (2003). The Great Escape: The Industrial Revolution in Theory and in History. Working 
Paper. Davis: University of California.  
Clark, G. (2005). The condition of the working class in England, 1209-2004. Journal of Political 
Economy, 113(6) ,1307-1340. doi. 10.1086/498123 
Currais, L., Rivera, B., & Rungo, P. (2009). Health improvements and the transition out of 
Malthusian stagnation. Bulletin of Economic Research, 61(4), 335-352. doi. 10.1111/j.1467-
8586.2008.00291.x 
Dalton, T.R., Coats, R.M., & Asrabadi, B.R. (2005). Renewable resources, property-rights regimes 
and endogenous growth. Ecological Economics, 52(1), 31-41. doi. 
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.03.033 
Desment, K., & Parente, S.L. (2012). The evolution of markets and the revolution of industry: a 
unified theory of growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 17(3), 205–234. doi. 10.1007/s10887-
012-9080-y 
Doepke, M. (2004). Accounting for fertility decline during the transition to growth.  Journal of 
Economic Growth, 9(3), 347-383. doi. 10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038935.84627.e4 
Duignan, P., & Gunn, L.H. (Eds.) (1973). Colonialism in Africa 1870 – 1960: A Bibliographic Guide 
to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ehrlich, P.R. (1998). The population bomb. Cutchogue, NY: Buccaneer Books. 
Elgin, C. (2012). A theory of economic development with endogenous fertility. Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, 16(5), 686-705. doi. 10.1017/S1365100510000842 
Floud, D. & McCloskey, D.N. (1994). The Economic History of Britain since 1700. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Galor, O. (2005a). From stagnation to growth: Unified Growth Theory. In P. Aghion & S. Durlauf 
(Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth (pp. 171-293). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.288-309. 
307 
Galor, O. (2005b). The demographic transition and the emergence of sustained economic growth. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3), 494-504. doi. 10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-
3.494 
Galor, O. (2007). Multiple growth regimes - Insights from unified growth theory. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 29(3), 470-475. doi. 10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.06.007 
Galor, O. (2008a). Economic growth in the very long run. In S.N. Durlauf & L.E. Blume  (Eds.), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics Online. doi. 10.1057/9780230226203.0434 
Galor, O. (2008b). Comparative Economic Development: Insight from Unified Growth Theory. 
[Retrieved from]. 
Galor, O. (2010). The 2008 Lawrence R. Klein lecture-Comparative economic development: Insights 
from Unified Growth Theory. International Economic Review, 51(1), 1-44. doi. 10.1111/j.1468-
2354.2009.00569.x 
Galor, O. (2011). Unified Growth Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Galor, O. (2012a). The demographic transition: Causes and consequences. Cliometrica, 6(1), 1-28. 
doi. 10.1007/s11698-011-0062-7 
Galor, O. (2012b). Unified Growth Theory and Comparative Economic Development. [Retrieved 
from]. 
Galor, O., & Michalopoulos, M. (2012). Evolution and the growth process: Natural selection of 
entrepreneurial traits. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(2), 759-780. doi. 
10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.005 
Galor, O., & Moav, O. (2001). Evolution and growth. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 718-729. 
doi.  10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00112-X 
Galor, O., & Moav, O. (2002). Natural selection and the origin of economic growth. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1133-1191. doi. 10.1162/003355302320935007 
Galor, O., & Mountford, A. (2003). Trading population for productivity. Working Paper, Brown 
University. 
Galor, O., & Mountford, A. (2006). Trade and the great divergence: The family connection. The 
American Economic Review, 96(2), 299-303. doi. 10.1257/000282806777212378 
Galor, O., & Mountford, A. (2008). Treading population for productivity: Theory and evidence. 
Review of Economic Studies, 75(4), 1143-1179. doi. 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00501.x 
Galor, O., & Weil, D.N. (1999). From Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. The American 
Economic Review, 89(2), 150-154. doi. 10.1257/aer.89.2.150 
Galor, O., & Weil, D.N. (2000). Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian stagnation to 
the demographic transition and beyond. The American Economic Review, 90(4), 806-828. doi. 
10.1257/aer.90.4.806 
Goodfriend, M. & McDermott, J. (1995). Early development. American Economic Review, 85(1), 
116-133. 
Hansen, G.D., & Prescott, E.C. (2002). Malthus to Solow. The American Economic Review, 92(2), 
1205-1217. doi. 10.1257/00028280260344731 
Jones, C.I. (2001). Was the industrial revolution inevitable? Economic growth over the very long run. 
Advances in Macroeconomics, 1, 1–43.  
Johnson, C.N., & Brook, B.W. (2011).  Reconstructing the dynamics of ancient human populations 
from radiocarbon dates: 10 000 years of population growth in Australia. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B, 278, 3748-3754. doi. 10.1098/rspb.2011.0343 
Kelly, M. (2001). Linkages, thresholds, and development. Journal of Economic Growth, 6(1), 39-53. 
doi. 10.1023/A:1009846027382 
Khan, A. (2008). The industrial revolution and the demographic transition.  Business Review, First 
Quarter, 9-15.   
Klasen, S., & Nestmann, T. (2006). Population, population density and technological change, Journal 
of Population Economics, 19(3), 611-626. doi. 10.1007/s00148-005-0031-1 
Kögel, T. & Prskawetz, A. (2001). Agricultural productivity growth and escape from the Malthusian 
trap. Journal of Economic Growth, 6(4), 337-357. doi. 10.1023/A:1012742531003 
Komlos, J.H. (1989). Thinking about industrial revolution. Journal of European Economic History, 
18, 191-206. 
Komlos, J. H. (2000). The industrial revolution as the escape from the Malthusian trap. Journal of 
European Economic History, 29, 307-331. 
Komlos, J. (2003). The industrial revolution as the escape from the Malthusian trap. Munich 
Discussion Paper No. 2003-13. Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München. 
Komlos, J., & Artzrouni, M. (1990). Mathematical investigations of the escape from the Malthusian 
trap. Mathematical Population Studies, 2(4), 147-157. 10.1080/08898489009525313 
Lagerlöf, N-P. (2003a). From Malthus to modern growth: Can epidemics explain three regimes? 
International Economic Review, 44, 755-777. 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00088 
Lagerlöf, N-P. (2003b). Mortality and early growth in England, France and Sweden. Scand. J. of 
Economics, 105(3), 419–439. 10.1111/1467-9442.t01-2-00006 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.288-309. 
308 
Lagerlöf, N-P.  (2006). The Galor-Weil model revisited: A quantitative exercise. Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 9(1), 116-142.  10.1016/j.red.2005.07.002 
Lagerlöf, N-P. (2010). From Malthusian war to Solovian peace. Review of Economic Dynamics, 
13(3), 616-636. 10.1016/j.red.2009.10.008 
Lee, R. (2003). The demographic transition: Three centuries of fundamental change. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 167-190. 10.1257/089533003772034943 
Lee, R. (2011). The outlook for population growth. Science, 333, 569-573. 10.1126/science.1208859 
Maddison, A. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD. 
Maddison, A. (2010). Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD. [Retrieved from]. 
Malthus, T.R. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population. London: J. Johnson.  
Mataré, H.F. (2009). The ephemeral existence of humanity. Mankind Quarterly, 49(3-4), 381-392. 
McEvedy, C. & Jones, R. (1978). Atlas of World Population History. Middlesex, England: Penguin.  
McFalls, Jr, J.A. (2007). Population: A Lively Introduction (5th ed.). Washington DC: Population 
Reference Bureau. 
McKay, J.P., Hill, B.D., Buckler, J., Ebrey, P.B., Beck, R.B., Crowston, C.H., & Wiesner-Hanks, 
M.E. (2012). A History of World Societies: From 1775 to Present. Volume C – From 1775 to the 
Present. Ninth edition. Boston, MA: Bedford Books. 
McKeown, T. (2009). The epidemiologic transition: Changing patterns of mortality and population 
dynamics. American Journal of Lifestyle Medicine, 3(1), 19S-26S. 10.1177/1559827609335350 
McNeill, J.R. (2000). Something new under the sun; An environmental history of the twentieth-
century world. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.  
Møller, N.F., & Sharp, P. (2013). Malthus in cointegration space: Evidence of a post-Malthusian pre-
industrial England. Journal of Economic Growth, 31(1), 68-93. 
Montgomery, K. (n.d.). The demographic transition. [Retrieved from].  
Nelson, R.R. (1956). Theory of the low level equilibrium trap in underdeveloped countries. American 
Economic Review, 46(5), 894-908. 
Nielsen, R.W. (2016a). Growth of the world population in the past 12,000 years and its link to the 
economic growth. Journal of Economics Bibliography, 3(1), 1-12.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016b). Mathematical analysis of the historical economic growth with a search for 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth. Journal of Economic Library, 3(1), 1-23.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016c). The dichotomy of Malthusian positive checks: Destruction and even more 
intensified regeneration. Journal of Economic Bibliography, 3(3), 409-433.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016d). Mathematical analysis of the historical income per capita distributions. 
Economic Review, 3(2), 300-319.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016e). Unified Growth Theory contradicted by the absence of takeoffs in the Gross 
Domestic Product. Economic Review, 3(1), 16-27.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016f). Unified Growth Theory contradicted by the mathematical analysis of the 
historical growth of human population. Journal of Economics and Political Economy, 3(2), 242-
263.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016g). Puzzling properties of the historical growth rate of income per capita 
explained. Journal of Economics Library, 3(2), 241-256.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016h). The postulate of the three regimes of economic growth contradicted by data. 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 3(1), 1-34.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016i). The unresolved mystery of the great divergence is solved. Journal of 
Economic and Social Thought, 3(2), 196-219.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016j). Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic growth or the growth of 
population even in the United Kingdom. Journal of Economic Bibliography, 3(4), 434-446.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016k). Scientifically unacceptable established knowledge in demography and in 
economic research. Journal of Economic Library, 3(3), 429-457.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016l). Demographic transition theory and its link to the historical economic growth. 
Journal of Economic and Political Economy, 3(1), 32-49.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016m). Mathematical analysis of income per capita in the United Kingdom. Turkish 
Economic Review, 3(4), 453-463.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016n). Interpretations of hyperbolic growth. Journal of Economics and Political 
Economy, 3(4), 594-626.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016o). The law of growth. Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 3(4), 349-357.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2016p). Mechanism of hyperbolic growth explained. Journal of Economic Library. 
3(4), 411-428.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2017a). Puzzling features of income per capita explained. Journal of Economics 
Bibliography. 4(1), 10-24.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2017b). Population and economic growth in Australia: 8,000 BC – AD 1700 and 
extended to 60,000 BC. Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 4(1), 41-54.  
Nielsen, R.W. (2017c). Economic growth and the growth of human population in the past 2,000,000 
years. Journal of Economic Bibliography, 4(2). Forthcoming. 
Nielsen, R.W. (2017d). Demographic catastrophes did not shape the growth of human population or 
economic growth. Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 4(2). 121-141. 
Omran, A.R. (1971). The epidemiologic transition: A theory of the epidemiology of population 
change. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 49(4), 509-538.  10.2307/3349375 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.288-309. 
309 
Omran, A.R. (1983). The epidemiologic transition theory. A preliminary update. Journal of Tropical 
Pediatrics, 29, 305-316.  10.1093/tropej/29.6.305 
Omran, A.R. (1986). The fourth stage of the epidemiologic transition: The age of delayed 
degenerative diseases. The Milbank Quarterly, 64(3), 355-391. 10.2307/3350025 
Omran, A.R. (1998). The epidemiological transition revisited thirty years later. World Health 
Statistics Quarterly, 51, 99-191. 
Omran, A.R. (2005). The epidemiologic transition: A theory of the epidemiology of population 
change. The Milbank Quarterly, 49(4), 731-757. 10.1111/j.1468-0009.2005.00398.x 
Pakenham, T. (1992). The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 
1876-1912. New York: Avon Books. 
Pólya, G. (1981). Mathematical Discovery: On Understanding, Learning, and Teaching Problem 
Solving. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. 
Robine, J-M. (2001). Redefining the stages of the epidemiological transition by a study of the 
dispersion of life spans: The case of France. Population, 13(1), 173-193. 
Smil, V. (1999). Detonator of the population explosion. Nature, 400, 415. 10.1038/22672 
Snowdon, B. & Galor, O. (2008). Towards a unified theory of economic growth. World Economics, 
9(2), 97-151..  
Steinmann, G., Prskawetz, A., & Feichtinger, G. (1998). A model on the escape from the Malthusian 
trap.  J Popul Econ, 11(4), 535-550. 10.1007/s001480050083 
Strulik, H. (1997). Learning-by-doing: Population pressure, and the theory of demographic transition. 
Journal of Population Economics, 10(3), 285-298. 10.1007/s001480050044 
Tamura, R.F. (2002). Human capital and the switch from agriculture to industry. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 27, 207-242. 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00032-X 
Thomlinson, R. (1965). Population dynamics: Causes and consequences of world demographic 
change.  New York: Random House. 
van de Kaa, D.J. (2008). Demographic transition. Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, 
Demography, Vol. 2. Paris: UNESCO 
Voigtländer, N., & Voth, H.-J. (2006). Why England? Demographic factors, structural change and 
physical capital accumulation during the industrial revolution. Journal of Economic Growth, 
11(4), 319–361. 10.1007/s10887-006-9007-6 
Vollrath, C. (2011). The agricultural basis of comparative development. Journal of Economic Growth, 
16, 343-370. 10.1007/s10887-011-9074-1 
von Foerster, H., Mora, P., & Amiot, L. (1960). Doomsday: Friday, 13 November, A.D. 2026. 
Science, 132, 255-296. 10.1126/science.132.3436.1291  
Wang, C. (2005). Institutions, demographic transition, and Industrial Revolution: A Unified Theory.  
SSRN Working Paper Series, 08/2005. 
Warf, B. (2010). Demographic transition.  In B. Warf (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Geography (pp. 708-
711) Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.  
Weisdorf, J.L. (2004). From stagnation to growth: Revising three historical regimes. Journal of 
Population Economics, 17(3), 455-472. 10.1007/s00148-004-0182-5 
Weiss, V. (2007). The population cycle drives human history – from a eugenic phase into a dysgenic 
phase and eventual collapse. The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 32(3), 327-
358. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
